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An Introduction to Non-Tariff
Barriers to Trade
ESTRICTIONS on international trade,
primarily in the form of non-tariff barriers,
have multiplied rapidly in the 1980s.’ The
Japanese, for example, began restricting
automobile exports to the United States in 1981.
One year later, the U.S. government, as part of
its ongoing intervention in the sugar market,
imposed quotas on sugar imports.
The increasing use of protectionist trade
policies raises national as well as international
issues. As many observers have noted, interna-
tional trade restrictions generally have costly
national consequences.5 The net benefits re-
ceived by protected domestic producers (that is,
benefits reduced by lobbying costs) tend to be
outweighed by the losses associated with ex-
cessive production and restricted consumption
of the protected goods. Protectionist trade
policies also cause foreign adjustments in pro-
duction and consumption that risks retaliation
by the affected country.
As a type of protectionist policy, non-tariff
barriers produce the general consequences iden-
tified above; however, there are numerous
reasons, besides their proliferation, to focus at-
tention solely on non-tariff barriers!’ Non-tariff
barriers encompass a wide range of specific
measures, many of whose effects are not easily
measured. For example, the effects of a govern-
ment procurement process that is biased toward
domestic producers are difficult to quantify. In
addition, many non-tariff barriers discriminate
among a country’s trading partners.
This discrimination violates the most-favored-
nation principle, a cornerstone of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
multinational agreement governing international
trade. Not only does the most-favored-nation
‘See Page (1987) for a general discussion indicating that
the proliferation of trade restrictions in recent years has
taken the form of non-tariff, as opposed to tariff, barriers.
A recent Congressional Budget Office study (1987) notes
that the average tariff rate for most developed countries is
less than 5 percent. There is no evidence of rising tariff
rates or coverage. Forexample, U.S. tariff revenue as a
percentage of total imports has changed very little be-
tween 1975 (3.9%) and 1986 (3.6%), See the Statistical
Abstract of the United States (various editions) for the
figures for other years.
2For example, see Coughlin et al. (1988).
tmSee chapter 1 in Laird and Yeats (forthcoming) for a
discussion of the policy issues raised by non-tariff barriers.
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principle require that a country treat its trading
partners identically, but it also requires that
trade barrier reductions negotiated on a
bilateral basis be extended to all GAT’I’ mem-
bers. By substituting bilateral, discriminatory
agreements for multilateral approaches to trade
negotiations and dispute settlement, countries
raise doubts about the long-run viability of
GATT.
This paper provides an introduction to non-
tariff barriers. We begin by identifying numer-
ous non-tariff barriers and document their pro-
liferation. We then use supply and demand
analysis to identify the general effects of two
frequently used non-tariff barriers: quotas and
voluntary export restraints. Next, we consider
why non-tariff barriers are used instead of
tariffs. A brief history of GATT’s attempts to
counteract the expansion of non-tariff barriers
completes the body of the paper.
NON-TARIFF BARRIERS:
TYPES AND USE
A tariff is a tax imposed on foreign goods as
they enter a country; non-tariff barriers, on the
other hand, are non-tax measures imposed by
governments to favor domestic over foreign
suppliers. Non-tariff barriers encompass a wide
range of measures. Some have relatively unim-
portant trade effects. For example, packaging
and labeling requirements can impede trade,
but usually only marginally. Other non-tariff
measures such as quotas, voluntary export
restraints, trade restraints under the Multifiber
Arrangement, non-automatic import authoriza-
tions and variable import levies have much
more significant effects.~These “hard-core” non-
tariff measures are designed to reduce imports
and, thereby, benefit domestic producers. The
discussion below focuses on these hard-core
barriers.
Quotas
A quota is simply a maximum limitation,
specified in either value or physical units, on
imports of a product for a given period. It is en-
forced through licenses issued to either im-
porters or exporters and may be applied to im-
ports from specific countries or from all foreign
countries generally. Two examples illustrate
these different characteristics. The United States
imposes a general quota on dried milk imports;
licenses are granted to certain U.S. trading com-
panies, who are allowed to import a maximum
quantity of dried milk based on their previous
imports. In a different situation U.S. sugar im-
ports are limited by a quota that specifies the
shares of individual countries; the right to sell
sugar to the United States is given directly to
the governments of these countries.
Voluntary Export Restraints and
the Multjfiber Arrangement
Voluntary export restraints, which are nearly
identical to quotas, are agreements between an
exporting and an importing country limiting the
maximum amount of exports in either value or
quantity terms to be sold within a given period.
Characterizing these restraints as “voluntary” is
somewhat misleading because they are fre-
quently designed to prevent official protective
measures by the importing country. In the
1980s, for example, exports by the Japanese
automobile industry to the United States and
the United Kingdom have been limited “volun-
tarily” to prevent the governments of these
countries from directly limiting imports of
Japanese autos.
An example of a voluntary export restraint on
a much broader scale is the Multifiber Arrange-
ment. Originally signed in 1974 as a temporary
exception to CA’T’T and renewed three times
since, the Multifiber Arrangement allows for
special rules to govern trade in textiles and ap-
parel. Under this agm’eement, quotas are set on
most imports of textiles and apparel by
developed countries from developing countries,
while imports of textiles and apparel from other
developed countm’ies except Japan are not sub-
ject to any restrictions. Multilateral voluntary
export restraint agreements are frequently
called “orderly marketing agreements.”
Non-Automatic Import
Authorizations
Non-automatic import authorizations are non-
tariff barriers in which the approval to import
is not granted freely or automatically. There
~This subset of non-tariff barriers is taken from Laird and
Yeats (forthcoming). This subset excludes a number of
non-tariff barriers that can also have sizeable effects.
Among these are government procurement policies, delays
at customs, health and sanitary regulations, technical stan-
dards, minimum import price regulations, tariff quotas and
monitoring measures. See appendix 4 in Laud and Yeats
for a glossary of terms associated with non-tariff barriers.
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are two general categories of non-automatic
licensing.
Discretionary licensing, often called liberal
licensing, occurs when an importer’s govern-
ment must approve a specific import; however,
precise conditions to ensure approval are not
specified. Frequently, this form of licensing is
used to administer quantitative limits. Under the
current restraints on U.S. imports of steel, a
domestic user can request authorization to ex-
ceed the maximum import limitation if the
specific product is unavailable domestically at a
reasonable cost. Exactly how availability and
cost considerations affect the probability of an
approval are left to the discretion of the
authorities.
The second category of non-automatic import
licensing requires the importer to meet specific
conditions, such as minimum export perfor-
mance, the use of the imported good for a
specific purpose or required purchases of
domestic products. In an export-import linkage
scheme, a firm’s value of imported components
is limited to a maximum percentage of the value
of its exports. ‘rhis measure is intended to im-
prove a country’s trade balance and protect
domestic producers of components.-5 Export-
import linkage requirements are numerous. For
example, in Yugoslavia during the early 1980s,
authorized importers of automobiles were re-
quired to export goods totaling at least 30 per-
cent of the value of each imported automobile.6
Variable lEnport Levies
Variable import levies are special charges set
to equalize the import price of a pm’oduct with a
domestic target price. ‘Fhe levies are variable so
that as the world price of a product falls (rises),
the levy rises (falls).’ The result is that price
changes in the world market will not affect
directly the domestic price. ‘I’hese measures are
an integral aspect of the European Community’s
Common Agricultural Policy. For example, in
March 1987, the European Community’s price
for wheat was $8.53 per bushel, while the
world price was $1.95 per bushel. Prospective
importers were faced with a levy of $6.58 per
bushel!’
The Use and Expansion of i\T
00
Tariff Barriers
In a current study, Laird and Yeats (forthcom-
ing) measure the share of a country’s imports
subject to hard-core non-tariff barriers. Because
countries frequently impose non-tariff barriers
on the imports of a specific good from a
specific country, but not on imports of the
same good from another country, they disag-
gregated each country’s imports by both pro-
duct and country of origin to permit calculation
of the total value of a country’s imports subject
to non-tariff barriers. Each country’s “coverage
ratio” is simply the value of imports subject to
non-tariff barriers divided by the total value of
imports.’
Table 1 shows the trade coverage ratio for 10
European Community and six other industrial
countries for 1981 and 1986. In computing this
ratio, the 1981 and 1986 non-tariff measures are
apphed to a constant 1981 trade base. ‘rhus, the
figures identify changes in the use, but not the
intensity, of specific non-tariff measures, while
holding constant the effects of trade changes.
‘See Herander and Thomas (1986) for a theoretical
demonstration that an export-import linkage scheme might
not improve a country’s trade balance.
6For details on the policies of Yugoslavia as well as
numerous other countries, see “Survey of Automotive
Trade Restrictions Maintained by Selected Nations”
(1982).
‘Variable import levies, which are actually variable tariffs,
are considered non-tariff barriers in this study for two
reasons. First, the international trade literature generally
characterizes variable import leviesas non-tariff barriers.
See Nogues et al. (1986) for another list of non-tariff bar-
riers that includes variable import levies. Second, Laird
and Yeats (forthcoming) provide the most up-to-date data
on non-tariff barriers and we have no way to remove
variable import levies from their data.
‘The numerical example is from Coughlin and Carraro
(1988).
‘One weakness of the coverage ratio as a measure of pro-
tectionism is that more-restrictive non-tariff barriers tend to
receive a lower weight in the construction of the coverage
ratio than less-restrictive ones. For example, a non-tariff
barrier that eliminated all imports of a good from a country
would have a smaller impact on the coverage ratio than a
less-restrictive measure. Assume that one country’s im-
ports are valued at $100, $15 of which comes from coun-
try A, and there are no non-tariff barriers. In this case, the
coverage ratio is zero. Suppose that a non-tariff barrier is
now imposed on imports of goods from country A. In the
first case, assume that imports from country A decline
from $15 to $10; alternatively, suppose that imports
decline from $15 to zero. The non-tariff barrier in the sec-
ond case is more restrictive; however, the change in the
coverage ratio does not reflect this fact. The coverage
ratio becomes 10.5 percent ($10/$95) in the first case and
zero percent ($01585) in the second. Thus, the “intensity”
of the protection provided by non-tariff barriers is not
measured accurately by this coverage ratio. An alternative
measure focusing on the share of trade “affected” by non-
tariff barriers, which also highlights the proliferation of
non-tariff barriers, can be found in Laird and Yeats (1989).
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A number of facts emerge i st, the cover tge
ratio aries ubstantially across countries. In
1981, the cove age ratio ranged from 6.7 per
cent in Denmark t 46.4 percent in et~Zea-
land and, in 1986, from 7.9 percent in Denm~k
0 32.4 pe cent in New Zealand. Second, for
most countri s, the coy age ra io ha in rease -
his caus d the coverage tatio u ing the world
tr de igures of all is ount ies to increase
from .1 percent in 1981 to 17.7 per ent n
1986. Third, the United States had the largest
percentage-point increase, as its coverage ratio
increased from 11.4 percent in 1981 to 17.3
percent in 1986. The 5.9 percentage-point in-
crease was more than double the increase for
all countries.
Laird and Yeats provide evidence that exports
from developing countries to industrial coun-
tries are affected to a larger extent than trade
among industrial countries. For example, the
1981 trade coverage ratio was 18.8 percent for
developing country exports to industrial coun-
tries and 14.3 percent for intra-industria~coun-
try trade. A similar pattern prevailed in 1986
with a coverage ratio of 20.6 percent for
developing country exports to industrial coun-
tries and 17.5 percent for intra-industrial coun-
try trade.b0
Table 2 contains coverage ratio data on a pro-
duct basis. As a result of the Multifiber Ar-
rangement, trade in textiles and clothing is sub-
ject to non-tariff barriers. For example, slightly
more than one-third of European Community
and U.S. imports of textiles are affected, while
approximately two-thirds of European Com-
munity and three-quarters of U.S. imports of
clothing are affected. Since these goods are
among the most impot’tant manufactured ex-
ports from developing countries, coverage ratios
for imports from developing countries relative
to industrial countries tend to be higher.
Table 2 also identifies some other manufac-
tured goods affected substantially by non-tariff
harriers, especially iron and steel and transport
equipment. More than three-quarters of U.S. im-
ports of iron arid steel and more than 40 per-
cent of transport equipment are affected. The
corresponding figures for the European Com-
munity are 46.2 percent and 23.6 percent.
While trade in manufactured goods is affected
substantially by non-tariff barriers, trade in
agricultural goods is affected to an even greater
extent. The coverage ratios for agricultural
goods shown in table 3 are substantially above
those for manufactured goods shown in table 2.
The agricultural coverage ratios frequently ex-
ceed 70 percent; see, for example, the U.S.
ratios for sugar and honey (91.9 percent), dairy
products (87.8 percent) and oil seeds and nuts
(74 percent). Even higher agricultural coverage
‘°Whiie this differential may reflect discrimination directed at
developing countries, another interpretation is that the dif-
ferential is product-based. Chow and Kellman (1988), for
example, show that the relatively higher tariff rates faced
by developing countries can be explained by product
characteristics.
JANIIARVIFFRR1IARV 14P,ciTable 2
Coverage Ratios of Selected Non-tariff Measures on Selected Manufactured
Goods: 1986
United
SITC Description 69 ~10~ Switzerland Finland Japan -- Norway New Zealand --States
61 Leather products 7 7% 30 8 S/r, 0 0% 47 0 % 0.0% 59 9% 0.0%
62 Rubbor products 9.1 0.0 00 13.6 0.7 539 00
63 Wood and cork I 0 19 00 00 00 53.0 0.0
64 Faperandart~Ies 59 00 00 00 00 486 00
65 Textiles 347 00 1 6 555 6.1 27.4 345
66 Cement. clay and glass 2.9 0.0 0.0 24.1 0.0 54.5 0 1
67 Iron and steel 462 10 00 0.0 00 64.1 763
68 Non-ferrous metals 0.8 1.9 35 04 0.0 8.7 0.0
69 Metal manufactures. n e 5. 2 1 5.6 00 1.0 0.0 35.3 11.0
71 Non-electric machinery 3.1 4.7 0.0 4.4 0.0 359 0.0
72 Electric machinery il_I 0.0 00 03 00 64.0 1.4
73 Transport equipment 236 847 00 173 0.0 22.1 41.1
81 Plumbing & lighting f:xtures 00 0.0 00 00 0.0 682 0.0
82 Furniture 0.3 0.0 00 00 0.1 0.0 1.1
83 Travel goods 0.9 530 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 18.9
84 Clothing 65.7 18.6 12.1 Il 3 865 52.2 764
85 Footwear 11.3 74.6 00 6.9 0.3 82.9 0.1
86 Instruments 3.8 00 0.0 14.1 0.0 53 0.0
NOTE See table 1 for the list of hard-core non-lariff measures The coverage ratio is. for each given product and country,
the imports subject to a hard-core non-tariff measure divided by total imports
European Community intro-trade is excluded.
SOURCE. Laird and Yeats (forthcoming)
Table 3
Coverage Ratios of Non4ariff Measures on Selected Agricultural Goods: 1986
United
SITC -- Description -. - EC ~1O~ Switzerland Finland Japan - Norway New Zealand States
00 Lmve animals 602% 100.0% 95.3% 1.2% 98.0% 00% 0.00/0
01 Meat 77 8 97.8 89.3 65.7 99 7 14.4 00
02 Dairy products 99.7 45.5 1000 732 82 1 12.7 87.8
03 Fish and seafood 46 583 97 100.0 80.4 36 0.0
04 Cereals and preparations 969 87.8 834 32.5 100.0 5 1 0.0
05 Fruits and vegetables 36.0 44.8 51.6 18.3 1000 392 0.9
06 Sugar and honey 85.8 0.0 89 1 84.6 1000 0.9 91.9
07 Colfee and cocoa 175 0.0 00 00 100.0 0.9 2.3
08 Animal feeds ii g 309 53 13.7 92.7 16.9 0.3
09 Food preparatons 10.2 13.4 0.0 173 1000 737 04
11 Beverages 249 764 88.0 70.7 100.0 5.6 00
12 Inbacco 0.0 0.0 0.0 843 00 5.1 00
21 H’des and skins 0.0 991 00 181 00 0.0 32
22 Oil seeds and nuts 24.8 560 1000 43 1000 00 74.0
23 Rubber 00 0.0 00 0.0 00 00 0.0
24 Wood and cork 06 396 0.0 0.0 00 24 00
25 Pulp and paper 00 0.0 00 0.0 00 00 00
26 Silk, wool, cotton. inc go 248 00 1 2 4.6 164 2.1
29 ~~udeanimal & vegetable matter 19 07 8 05.3 51.8 69 1 11 2 11.0
NOTE See table 1 br the t:si of hard-core ncr-la-itt measures. The coverage rato is. for each given product and coun-
try the imports sub~ecito a hard-core non tariff measure divided by tnmat imports
Euiopear community nt,a-tiade ‘s excluoeo
SOURCE Laird and Yeats tfodhcoming~37
Table 4
The Use of Selected Non-tariff Measures
Change in the Share of Imports
Share of Imports Facing NTMs. 19811 Facing NTMs, 1981~862
Importer QUOT VER MFA NAIA VIL QUOT VER MFA NAIA VIL
Belgium Luxembourg 03% 5.1% 1 2% 5.7% 5.2% 11% 22% 0.0% 00% 0.0%
Denmark 03 2.6 23 1.1 1.4 01 12 —01 0.0 00
Gennany. Fed. Rep. 05 3.0 4.9 3.0 20 0.4 20 —06 00 00
France 58 12 18 7.1 2.2 16 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Greece 82 &8 12 3.9 38 0.4 4.4 00 00 00
Great Britain 22 2.0 29 5.1 4.4 —0.9 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ireland 0.1 4.6 1.3 2.2 22 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Daly 7.5 0.8 18 70 66 0.6 1.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 04 2.0 30 14.0 63 2.5 36 —02 0.0 0.0
EC (10~ 26 23 30 5.6 3.7 0.5 2.1 -02 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 25 0.0 0.4 28 05 00 00 0.0 00 0.0
Finland 09 0.0 02 6.7 18 00 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Japan 142 0.0 0.0 7.7 1.8 01 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Norway 52 0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0 -05 00 0.0 1.1 0.0
New Zealand 253 ao 0.0 256 00 16 00 0.0 —8.8 0.0
United Stales 05 69 32 ao 0.0 15 44 00 0.0 1.4
All above 4.0 3.1 2.3 42 2.0 07 22 —0.1 —01 0.4
Petroleum prooucts have been excluded trom the calculations The abbrevialions for the non-tariff measures are as follows:
QUOT—quotas, VER —voluntary export restraints; MEA—restrictions under the MultifiberArrangement: NAIA-—non-automatic
import authorizations; and VIL—-variable import levies.
2The change is tne 1986 share less the 1981 share.
3European Community intra-trade is excluded.
SOURCE: Laird and Yeats (forthcoming)
ratios are found for the European Community
and Japan.
Another dimension of the use of non-tariff
barriers concerns differences in the use of
specific barriers across countries. Table 4 shows
the share of imports (by country) that faced dif-
ferent non-tariff measures in 1981 and how this
share changed by 1986. A number of facts
emerge. In 1981, non-automatic import authori-
zations and quotas affected the largest share of
imports when all 16 countries are considered;
by 1986, this was no longer the case. Voluntary
export restraints, whose use in the United
States, Greece, the Netherlands and Great Bri-
tain rose substantially, affected the largest share
of imports (5.3 percent) by 1986. Meanwhile,
the share of imports affected by quotas rose
from 4 percent in 1981 to 4.7 percent by 1986.
Comparisons of the specific measures across
countries indicate that voluntary export re-
straints were used more extensively by the
United States than by other countries. By 1986,
11.3 percent of U.S. imports were affected by
voluntary export restraints; Greece, with 9.2
percent, had the next-highest share of its im-
ports affected by these restraints.
SUPPLY AND DEMAND ANALYSIS
USING QUOTAS AND VOLUNTARY
EXPORT RESTRAINTS
Although the quantitative effects of non-tariff
barriers are not always easily identified and
measured, a theoretical identification of their
major effects can be derived using supply and
demand analysis. We begin by examining the ef-
fects of a quota, then discuss how a voluntary
expori restraint can be analyzed similarly.
In figure 1, lID represents the U.S. import
demand curve for some good produced by U.S.
and foreign producers. The foreign supply
curve (that is, the supply curve for imports into
the United States) for the good is SS. With free
trade, the United States will import QF units of
the good and pay a price per unit of ~F-
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Figure 1
The Price and Quantity Effects of a Quota
and a Voluntary Export Restraint
Price
PQ
Now, suppose that an import quota of Qq is
imposed by the United States. This restriction
causes the import supply curve to become ver-
tical at the restricted quantity. Thus, the import
supply curve is the kinked curve SCS’. The
restriction reduces the quantity of imports from
°,Fto Qq~ the domestic price to rise from P8 to
PQ and the foreign price to decline from P8 to
PJ3.” The higher domestic price reduces total
U.S. consumption of the good, but increases
U.S. production; thus, U.S. producers of the
good benefit at the expense of U.S. consumers
in general. The difference between what
domestic and foreign consumers pay, 8B~Q~ is a
premium per unit of imports that can be ap-
propriated by exporters, importers or govern-
ment. The method used to allocate import
licenses determines the distribution of these
premiums among the potential claimants.
A voluntary export restraint has the same
general effects as an equivalent quota. A volun-
‘1Figure I can also be used to illustrate a variable import
levy. While a quota limits the quantity ot imports, a
variable import levy is used to fix the price. Assuming a
target (domestic) price of PQ, when world prices fall below
this price, the levy will be altered automatically to maintain
the price of P0. Thus, no matter how far world prices
decline, the quantity of imports will not rise above O~.
Consequently, a variable import le’~y and a quota have the
same effect, even though they are implemented differently.
‘2Theoretical research on the impact ot non-tariff barriers
has explored various issues that we do not mention in the
tary export restraint reduces the quantity of im-
ports, which, in turn, causes the domestic price
to rise and the foreign price to fall as shown in
figure 1. Again, the higher domestic price
benefits U.S. producers of this good at the ex-
pense of U.S. consumers. Finally, the difference
between what domestic and foreign consumers
pay, 8B~q~ is a premium per unit of imports
that can he captured by exporters, importers or
government.
While the supply and demand analysis isolates
the major effects of two frequently used non-
tariff barriers, it conveys virtually no informa-
tion about either the magnitude of the costs and
benefits of non-tariff barriers or their dynamic
consequences.’2 Various case studies, however,
have provided estimates of these costs and
benefits. A review of this literature can he
found in Laird and Yeats. Two case studies are
provided in the shaded inserts on pages and
Quantity of as examples of such analyses. The first exam-
Imports pIe examines the impact of the U.S. quota on
sugar imports; the second examines the effect
of the U.S-Japanese agreement to limit Japanese
automobile exports to the United States.
As a protectionist policy, non-tariff barriers
are a method for redistributing wealth from
consumers in general to selected firms and
workers. This redistribution is abetted by con-
sumer ignorance and the costs of mobilizing an
effective force to counteract protectionist
demands. As Coughlin et al. (1988) have demon-
strated recently, the benefits received by se-
lected groups of firms and workers are far out-
weighed by the costs borne by the rest of the
population.
WHY USE NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
INSTEAD OF TARIFFS?
Since non-tariff barriers have been used in-
creasingly in recent years, an obvious question
is why non-tariff harriers rather than tariff bar-
text, two of which are mentioned below. Since many
markets for internationally traded goods are imperfectly
competitive, a standard topic in introductory international
trade texts is to identify the effect of an import quota in
the presence of monopoly. See Krugman and Obstfeld
(1988) tor an elementary discussion. Since voluntary
export restraints discriminate among trading partners, the
effects ofthis differential treatment have been explored.
See Jones (1984) for such an analysis.
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2ifl early 1985. the Reagar- administration decided that level and ,n 1987 extended Inc restraints for another
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for an extension Nevertheless in early 1985. the dication mat the Japanese. especi&iy automobile po
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early 1987 at a level 24 percent above the previous
riers have become so popular.’3 A review by
Deardorff (1987) concludes that there currently
is no definitive answer to this question; how-
ever, numerous reasons have been suggested.
The Impact of GATT: An Institu-
tional Constraint on the Use of
Tarjffs
GATT is an institution whose original mission
was to restrict the use of tariffs. Given this con-
straint, policymakers willing to respond to pro-
tectionist demands were forced to use non-tariff
devices. Thus, in this case, non-tariff barriers
are simply a substitute for tariffs. In fact, re-
search by Ray (1981) indicates that non-tariff
barriers have been used to reverse the effects
of multilateral tariff reductions negotiated
under GATT.14
Certainty of Domestic Benefits
Deardorff (1987) suggests that non-tariff bar-
riers are preferred to tariffs because policy-
makers and demanders of protection believe
that the effects of tariffs are less certain. This
perception could be due to various reasons,
some real and some illusory. For example, it
may be much easier to see that a quota of I
million limits automobile imports to 1 million
than to demonstrate conclusively that a tariff
of, say, $300 per car would result in imports of
only I million automobiles.
In part, doubts that tariffs will have the
desired effect is based on the possibility of ac-
tions that could be taken to offset the effects of
higher tariffs. For example, the imposition of a
tariff may induce the exporting country to sub-
sidize the exporting firms in an attempt to
reduce the tariff’s effectiveness. The effects of
quotas, on the other hand, are not altered by
such subsidies.’~
“Dating from Bhagwati’s seminal discussion in 1965, com-
parisons of the theoretical effects of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers have been a frequent topic in the international
trade literature. Under various circumstances, a tariff and
a specific non-tariff barrier, say, a quota, can cause dif-
ferent final prices and production despite reducing trade
by equal amounts. These circumstances produce what is
termed nonequivalence. Tariffs and quotas are equivalent
when markets are pertectly competitive. In this case, there
is no reason to prefer one to the other.
Bhagwati (1965, 1968) has demonstrated that the
equivalence of tariffs and quotas breaks down in imper-
fectly competitive markets. Numerous situations can be
characterized as imperfectly competitive. To date, how-
ever, the literature has provided no compelling reasons for
preferring non-tariff over tariff barriers. For a recent exam-
ple from this literature, see Krishna (1985).
‘4A question remains, however, as to why the framers of
GATT chose to focus primarily on tariffs rather than non-
tarift barriers.
‘5Deardorff’s (1987) review provides another perspective on
the role of uncertainty. The optimatity of trade policy tools
has been explored extensively using trade models with
uncertainty. These models, which rely on risk aversion
(that is, an individual requires a higher expected return as
compensation for an increase in risk) and uncertainty
originating outside a country, conclude that quotas are
preferred to tariffs. The country is insulated from the
uncertainty stemming from randomness in world prices or
import supply curves by a quota that stabilizes the price
and quantity of imports. One problem with this explana-
tion, however, is that the quota is instituted before the
uncertain state of the world is known, while in the real
world protection is generally provided after a change in the
world market.
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Benefits to Other Parties
The supply and demand analysis of quotas
and voluntary export restraints highlights the
difference per unit of import between what
domestic and foreign consumers pay. This price
differential reflects the extent of the gains that
are available for some group to appropriate.
With tariffs) the price differential is captured by
the domestic government in the form of tariff
revenue. With non-tariff barriers, the domestic
government is not a direct beneficiary unless it
sells the rights to import to the highest bidders.
Otherwise, domestic importers) foreign ex-
porters and foreign governments capture these
gains. The potential distribution of these bene
fits can influence the domestic government’s
choice between tariff and non-tariff barriers.
With voluntary export restraints, the price dif-
ferential identified above is typically captured
by the exporting firms from the foreign coun-
try. This result may reduce the likelihood that
the foreign country will retaliate against such
restrictions. Given certain demand conditions in
both the U.S. and foreign markets, voluntary ex-
port restraints can entail a substantial redistrib-
ution from consumers in the importing country
to selected producers in the exporting country.
For example, Collyns and Dunaway (1987)
estimate that the U.S-Japanese voluntary export
restraint on automobiles yielded increased
benefits to selected Japanese auto producers
ranging from $1 billion to $5.25 billion in 1984.
Hillman and Ursprung (1988) extend the
preceding idea using a simple model of trade
policy formulation in which a democratic
government is choosing between a tariff and a
voluntary export restraint.bO A simplification in
this model, whose importance is discussed
below, is that rival political candidates place no
value on tariff revenue. Assume a voluntary ex-
port restraint and a tariff generate identical
domestic producer benefits. Politicians will sup-
port the voluntary export restraint over the
tariff because the voluntary export restraint
generates benefits for foreign producers that, in
turn, can be appropriated partially by the politi-
cians in the form of campaign contributions. On
the other hand, the tariff revenue is assumed to
have no value for politicians. Candidates for
elective office are viewed as announcing trade
policy positions to maximize campaign contribu-
tions from domestic and foreign producer
interests.
In addition to increasing the probability that
protectionism will take the form of voluntary
export restraints rather than tariffs, the argu-
ment reveals a way that political candidates can
personally capture revenues that, with tariffs,
would have accrued to the domestic govern-
ment. Nonetheless, the assumption about the
perceived value of tariff revenue to politicians
and the fact that consumer interests are ig-
nored in the analysis suggests one should be
cautious in generalizing this result.
The possible benefits to domestic politicians of
using non-tariff rather than tariff barriers are
not restricted to campaign contributions. For ex-
ample, a tariff is an explicit tax on consumers
while a quota is an implicit tax on them. Policy-
makers might find it easier to support quotas
and other non-tariff barriers because they will
not be directly associated with a tax increase
that consumers, as voters, might resist.”
l6Husted (1986) also connects foreign lobbying to the
domestic economy. He finds that the dollar value of
foreign lobbying in the United States is small relative to
other traded service flows and that the returns to foreign
lobbying generate large returns. For example, Husted
calculated that the expenditure in the United States of
$1.4 million on foreign lobbying by the world automobile
industry came primarily from Japan. Given the estimates
by Collyns and Dunaway (1987) and others indicating
Japanese automobile rents exceeded $1 billion in 1984,
U.S. politicians do not appear to be capturing much of
these rents.
“A neglected issue in the preceding comparison of non-
tariff barriers with tariffs is the distribution of these restric-
tions across industries. While Ray (1981) found that non-
tariff barriers and tariffs are biased toward industries in
which the United States has a comparative disadvantage,
he also found some maior differences. Tariffs are biased
toward low-skill rather than capital-intensive industries and
are unrelated to product heterogeneity and the
geographical dispersion of domestic production facilities.
On the other hand, non-tariff barriers are biased toward
capital-intensive industries producing fairly homogeneous
products. Production in these industries tends to be




The history of multilateral trade negotiations
dealing with non-tariff barriers is brief.’3
Multilateral trade negotiations are conducted
under the auspices of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, which was created short-
ly after World War II. GATT, a term that en-
compasses the multilateral agreement governing
international trade, the bodies administering the
agreement, and all associated trade-related ac-
tivities, has focused on the reduction of tariff
rather than non-tariff barriers, To date, seven
rounds of GATT negotiations have been com-
pleted, with the first six concerned almost ex-
clusively with tariffs.19
The Tokyo Round
The ‘Tokyo Round, the most recently com-
pleted round lasting from 1973 to 1979, was a
comprehensive effort to reduce trade obstacles
stemming from tariffs and non-tariff measures.
New or reinforced agreements called “codes,”
were reached on the following non-tariff mea-
sures: 1) subsidies and countervailing duties; 2)
government procurement; 3) technical stan-
dards; 4) import licensing procedures; 5) cus-
toms valuation; and 6) anti.dumping,20
The code on subsidies and countervailing
duties prohibits direct export subsidies, except
under certain situations in agriculture. This
code is noteworthy in extending GATT’s prohibi-
tion of export subsidies to trade in raw matet-
ials. Because nearly all governments subsidize
domestic producers to some extent, the code es-
tablished criteria to distinguish between a do-
mestic and an export subsidy. Domestic subsi-
dies that treat domestic and export activities
identically are generally allowed. Countervailing
duties, which are tariffs to offset a subsidy
received by a foreign exporter, are prohibited
unless the subsidized goods are shown to be
causing (or threatening) “material” injury to a
domestic producer. This code also allows a
country to seek redress for cases in which
another country’s subsidized exports displace its
exports in third-country markets.
The code on government procurement states
that, for qualifying nonmilitary purchases,
governments (including government-controlled
entities) must treat foreign and domestic pro-
ducers alike. In addition to resolving disputes,
the code establishes procedures for opening and
awarding bids.
The code on technical standards attempts to
ensure that technical regulations and product
standards such as labeling, safety, pollution and
quality requirements do not create unnecessary
obstacles to trade. ‘the code does not specify
standards; however, it establishes rules for set-
ting standards and resolving disputes.
The code on import licensing procedures,
similar to the code on technical standards, is
not spelled out in detail. Generally speaking,
governments stated their commitment to sim-
plify the procedures that importers must follow
to obtain licenses. Reducing delays in licensing
and paperwork are two areas of special
interest.
The code on customs valuation established a
uniform system of rules to determine the cus-
toms value for imported goods. This code uses
transaction prices to determine value and is
designed to preclude the use of arbitrary values
that increase the protective effect of a tariff
rate.
Finally, the anti-dumping code prescribes rules
for anti-dumping investigations, the imposition
of anti-dumping duties and settling disputes.
The standards for determining injury are clari-
fied. This code obligates developed countries to
treat developing countries preferentially.
‘8For a brief history of multilateral trade negotiations, as well
as details on the current negotiations, see The GATT
Negotiations and U.S. Trade Policy, a 1987 study by the
Congressional Budget Office For additional details on the
current multilateral negotiations, see Aniaria (1986) and
the 1987 report by the United States International Trade
Commission, Operation of fhe Trade Agreements Program.
19The sixth round, known as the Kennedy Round, marked
the first time for a GATT agreement on non-tariff barriers.
Agreements were reached on an anti-dumping code and
the elimination the U.S. system of American Selling
Prices, which applied a tariff rate for certain imports to an
artificially high dutiable value. The dutiable value was set
equal to the price of a competing good produced
domestically instead of to the import’s actual invoice price.
This system was applied to a small portion of total imports,
primarily benzenoid chemicals and rubber footwear. Both
agreements were blocked by Congress, but were accepted
in the next round of negotiations.
‘°Non-tariffbarriers were also reduced in civil aircraft and
selected agricultural goods, primarily meat and cheese.
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The Uruguay Round
The Tokyo Round codes have relied on good-
faith compliance, which has tended to under-
mine their effectiveness. Streamlining and
resolving disputes is a priority during the cur-
rent round of multilateral negotiations, the
Uruguay Round. The Tokyo Round codes will
be reviewed and possibly modified during the
Uruguay Round. In particular, broadening the
government procurement code to include ser-
vice contracts will be discussed. Concerning the
technical standards code, agreements dealing
with the mutual acceptance of test data gener-
ated by other parties and the openness of the
activities of standards bodies will be sought. A
major issue in the anti-dumping code is how to
handle input dumping (that is, export sales of
products that contain inputs purchased at
dumped prices).
The Uruguay Round, begun in September
1986, has and will discuss a number of non-
tariff barrier issues, many of which extend
beyond the codes of the Tokyo Round. Trade
issues involving agriculture and services (bank-
ing, construction, insurance and transportation)
are of paramount importance. The United States
has proposed the elimination of all trade- and
production-distorting agricultural policies. While
the major agricultural nations have agreed to
the principle of liberalizing agriculture, the
sweeping nature of the U.S. proposal has been
resisted by some nations, especially the Euro-
pean Community. With respect to services, the
primary goal is to establish principles for exten-
ding GATT coverage to this trade.
A recent study by the Congressional Budget
Office (1987) predicts that the performance of
the Uruguay Round will be judged largely on its
handling of non-tariff barrier issues. GATT has
not effectively combatted rising non-tariff bar-
riers for many reasons. Two reasons are that
the effects of non-tariff barriers are less trans-
parent than the effects of tariffs and, in many
cases, non-tariff barriers are designed to satisfy
a domestic rather than an international objec-
tive. A major obstacle is determining at what
point a national economic policy, whose interna-
tional effects are somewhat uncertain, becomes
an internationally unacceptable non-tariff bar-
rier. ‘I’hese national economic policies have fre-
quently resulted from the lobbying efforts of
strong domestic constituencies such as
agricultural interests. ‘Thus, major trade policy
reform will be met with much resistance from
these groups.
CONCLUSION
Non-tariff barriers have effects similar to
those of tariffs: they increase domestic prices
and impede trade to protect selected producers
at the expense of domestic consumers. As
shown in the case studies of sugar and automo-
biles, they also have other effects, generally
adverse.
Despite the adverse national consequences,
the use of non-tariff barriers has increased
sharply in recent years. The chances for a re-
versal of this trend appear to be small. The
variety of non-tariff measures, the difficulties of
identifying and measuring their effects and the
benefits received by specific groups combine to
make a significant reduction of non-tariff bar-
riers in the ongoing Uruguay Round negotia-
tions unlikely.
The original mission of GAn, which has been
largely achieved, was to reduce tariffs. The
question, however, of why policymakers have
preferred to use non-tariff barriers rather than
tariffs in recent years remains. The more cer-
tain protective effects of non-tariff bat-riers is
one plausible explanation. A second explanation,
which focuses on the distribution of the bene-
fits, is that the benefits of non-tariff barriers
can be captured by foreign producers and
domestic politicians. Such an allocation of bene-
fits increases the probability that the political
process generates larger amounts of non-tariff
barriers relative to tariffs. A final explanation is
that their adverse effects are generally less ob-
vious to consumers than the effects of tariffs.
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